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Abstract
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) argued that a solution concept to a game should be invariant
under the addition or deletion of an equivalent strategy and not require the use of weakly
dominated strategies. In this paper we study which of these requirements are satisfied by Kalai and
Samet’s (1984) concepts of persistent equilibria and persistent retracts. While none of these
concepts has all the invariance properties, we show that a slight rephrasing of the notion of a
persistent retract leads to a notion satisfying them all. Ó 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights
reserved.
Keywords: Noncooperative games; Solutions; Invariance; Ordinality
JEL classification: C72
1. Introduction
Kalai and Samet (1984) introduced the notion of a persistent retract to select among
the Nash equilibria of a game. They call a Nash equilibrium contained in a persistent
retract a persistent equilibrium. However, persistent retracts are also of interest in
themselves because they can be viewed as sets of rules that are self-enforcing in a strong
sense. By a rule we mean hereby a restriction of the possible behavior of a player to a
subset of his strategies, not necessarily to a single strategy. One can think for instance of
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traffic rules like ‘‘drive on the right side of the road’’. Traffic rules restrict the behavior
of car drivers, but they are not intended to determine their behavior in all circumstances,
as a single strategy would. Similarly participation in a market typically requires
adherence to certain rules which still leave room for individual decisions. We cannot
expect rational players to follow a set of rules unless it is self enforcing in the sense that
no player has an incentive to violate the rules as long as he expects everyone else to
follow the rules. The idea to consider self-enforcing sets of rules rather than just self
enforcing strategy profiles, i.e. Nash equilibria, is appealing because it will often be
impossible or undesirable to agree on social conventions that perfectly determine
behaviour. A set of rules is strongly self-enforcing if no player wants to violate them
even if he has a slight uncertainty about everyone else following the rules. Whereas Nash
equilibria are self-enforcing considering strongly self-enforcing sets of rules leads to a
different, set valued concept, the persistent retracts. The latter are more akin to some
set-valued concepts discussed in the literature like the primitive formations used in the
theory of equilibrium selection by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the curb sets of Basu and
Weibull (1991) and the sets closed under better replies by Ritzberger and Weibull
(1995). Balkenborg (1992) discusses a unified approach to compare these concepts.
Whereas simple learning processes do often not converge to Nash equilibrium, see e.g.
Fudenberg and Levine (1998), there are a number of positive convergence results for
these set valued concepts, see e.g. Hurkens (1995), Sanchirico (1996) and Ritzberger
and Weibull (1995). Hurkens (1995) in particular discusses a simple stochastic learning
process which always converges to a persistent retract.
What distinguishes persistent retracts from the other set valued concepts are their
invariance properties. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) argued that a solution concept
should not depend on modelling details. In particular they made the following two
requirements on solution concepts for normal form games: (a) The solutions should be
invariant to the addition or deletion of payoff-equivalent strategies. (b) The solutions
should not prescribe the use of weakly dominated strategies. Mertens (1987) went
further and argued that we lack a theory of ordinal equivalence of games and that the
solutions we consider should respect ordinal equivalence. In the theory he developed
ordinal invariance can be derived from invariance requirements closely related to those
above. However, (b) is replaced by the slightly different requirement that the solutions
should only depend on the ‘‘admissible best reply structure’’ of a game which we will
use here.
Regardless of whether one considers these requirements as indispensable or not, it is
certainly useful to know whether a solution concept satisfies them or how it violates
them. We discuss here the invariance properties of persistent equilibria and related
concepts. For other solution concepts we refer to Mertens (1987) and Vermeulen and
Jansen (1997). Some results on the invariance properties of persistent retracts and
equilibria are already given in Mertens (1987). They are included in this paper for
completeness.
To obtain existence of persistent equilibria, Kalai and Samet require a persistent
retract to be convex. If one is primarily interested in self-enforcing sets of rules, this
restriction is not necessary. Without the convexity requirement one obtains a slightly
different concept which we call ‘‘persistent set’’. However, convexity still plays an
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indirect role, via the formation of beliefs. We will show that persistent retracts can be
viewed as the set of beliefs associated with persistent sets.
To select among equilibria as sharply as possible, the definition of a persistent retract
entails a minimality condition. As in Basu and Weibull (1991) one can replace
minimality by a weaker condition called ‘‘tightness’’ without altering our main
conclusions.
Persistent or tight Persistent or tight Persistent
absorbing sets absorbing retracts equilibria
Weak invariance Yes Yes Yes
Invariance Yes No No
abr-invariance Yes Yes Yes for n 5 2
No for n . 2
This table summarizes the results. We distinguish weak invariance, (full) invariance and
abr-invariance. Weak invariance refers to the behavior of a solution when a payoff-
equivalent strategy is deleted, invariance to the behavior when such a strategy is added
or deleted. abr-invariance refers to invariance under the admissible best reply structure.
All concepts satisfy weak invariance. For persistent retracts and equilibria this was
first noted by Mertens (1987). However, he showed also that they do not satisfy
invariance. In contrast we show here that the notions of tight absorbing or persistent sets
we introduce satisfy all the invariance properties and are hence ordinally invariant in the
sense of Mertens (1987). Mertens observed that persistent retracts satisfy abr-invariance.
We show in addition that persistent equilibria satisfy abr-invariance for two player
games, but not for games with more than two players.
In the remainder of this paper we will discuss cell by cell each entry in the table.
Some basic terminology for normal form games is fixed in Section 2. In Section 3 we
introduce the solution concepts. Loosely speaking our main result in this section states
that persistent retracts correspond to the beliefs associated with a persistent set. The
proof is given in the Appendix. Section 4 provides the definitions of the various
invariance properties along with a discussion of the underlying motivations. In Sections
5 and 6 these properties are studied for the various solution concepts. Section 7
concludes.
2. Preliminaries
For a natural number n, a ( finite n-person normal form) game is a pair G 5 kA, ul
such that A[P A is a product of n non-empty, finite sets and u 5 (u ) is an n-tuplei i i[N
i
of functions u : A fi IR. A is called the set of pure strategies of player i and u is hisi i i
payoff function.
As usual, a game G 5 kA, ul will be identified with its mixed extension. For this
game, the mixed strategies of player i are the elements of the set D(A ) of probabilityi
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distributions on A . By abuse of notation we will identify a pure strategy a [ A withi i i
the mixed strategy in D(A ) that puts all weight on a . So, A will simply be viewed as ai i i
subset of D(A ). Pure strategy profiles will be denoted by a [ A.i
For a (mixed) strategy profile x 5 (x ) [ D [P D(A ) we define, as usual, thei i[N A i
i[N
(expected) payoff function of player i by u (x)[o P x (a )u (a) where x (a ) is thei a[A j j i j jj
probability with which a is played in x . Furthermore, (xuy ) [ D denotes the strategyj j i A
profile where player i uses y [ D(A ) and his opponents use their strategies in x [ D .i i A
For a strategy profile x [ DA
b (x)[h y [ D(A )uu (xuy ) $ u (xuz ) for all z [ D(A )ji i i i i i i i i
is the set of best replies (of player i) to x. The strategy profiles in the set b(x)[P b (x)i
i
are called best replies to x. A strategy profile x [ D is called a Nash equilibrium of G ifA
x [ b(x).
3. Persistent equilibria and related solution concepts
A non-empty subset R , D of strategy profiles is called a product set if R 5P RA i
i
with R , D(A ) for each player i. If the product set R is convex we call it a retract.i i
Notice that a product set is convex if and only if each of its components is convex.
Let U be an open subset in D . We say that a set of strategies R of player i absorbs UA i
if for every strategy profile in U there is a best reply against this profile in R . A producti
set R is said to absorb U, if each of its components R absorbs U.i
Definition. A product set R is an absorbing set if it absorbs some convex open
neighborhood of itself.
Remark 1. The preceding definition requires a convex neighborhood for the following
reason: a belief of a player i ± j over player j’s strategy choice is a probability
distribution over the mixed strategy space D(A ). For the purpose of utility maximizationj
this belief can be identified with the expected mixed strategy it induces. Player i is
certain that player j will make a strategy choice in R 7 D(A ) if the support of his beliefj j
is in R . The expected mixed strategy will hence be in the closed convex hull of R . If wej j
consider a small open neighborhood of this set, which we can itself assume to be convex,
we allow for the possibility that player i is slightly uncertain about whether player j
chooses a strategy in R or not. Thus a product set R is absorbing if no player i has ani
incentive to violate the rule ‘‘choose in R ’’, as long as he is almost certain that hisi
opponents follow the rule ‘‘choose in R ’’.j
We can now proceed with the definition of the solution concepts considered in this
paper:
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Definitions. A persistent set is an absorbing product set which does not properly contain
another absorbing product set.
A persistent retract (Kalai and Samet, 1984) is an absorbing retract which does not
properly contain another absorbing retract.
A persistent equilibrium (Kalai and Samet, 1984) is a Nash equilibrium contained in a
persistent retract.
Kalai and Samet (1984) showed that every game has a persistent retract and that every
persistent retract contains a Nash equilibrium. In particular, a persistent equilibrium
always exists.
If the primary interest is not in selecting among Nash equilibria, but in strongly
self-enforcing sets of rules one can replace the minimality condition in the definition of a
persistent set / retract as follows (compare Basu and Weibull, 1991):
Definition. An absorbing set (retract) R is called tight if no open convex neighborhood
of R is absorbed by a product set (retract) properly contained in R.
Our main result in this section states that the persistent retracts correspond to the sets
of beliefs associated with persistent sets. We need the following additional notation. The
convex hull of a set X in some Euclidean space is denoted by conv(X). Conversely, the
set of extremal points of a convex set Y (i.e. the set of points in the closure of Y which
cannot be written as proper convex combinations of other points in the closure of Y) is
denoted by ext(Y).
Proposition 1. Let G be a game and let R , D be a product set. Then the followingA
three statements are equivalent
(i) R is a persistent retract.
(ii) R is the convex hull of a persistent set.
(iii) R is closed and convex and ext(R) is a persistent set.
The same holds if ‘‘persistent’’ is replaced by ‘‘tight absorbing’’ in the previous
statement.
The proof, which uses and extends several central findings in Kalai and Samet (1984), is
given in Appendix A. The central tool will be a careful analysis of the minimal sets of
strategies of a player that absorb an open set.
It will further be shown in the appendix that every absorbing set contains a persistent
set. From the above proposition it follows that every absorbing retract contains a
persistent retract. Hence the persistent sets (retracts) are exactly the minimal tight
absorbing sets (retracts).
9Call two strategies of a player x , x [ D(A ) player-equivalent if they yield the samei i i
payoff for the player regardless of the strategies played by the opponents, i.e., if we have
for all y [ DA
9u ( yux ) 5 u ( yux ).i i i i
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9We may still have u ( yux ) ± u ( yux ) for some other player j ± i.j i j i
There will be no player-equivalent pure strategies in our examples. The following
further consequence from the results in the appendix is therefore useful when studying
them:
Proposition 2. A tight absorbing set is finite. If no player has two distinct player-
equivalent pure strategies, then a tight absorbing set contains only pure strategy
combinations.
Example 1. We consider the following three games
The Battle-of-the-Sexes game depicted on the left has two persistent sets, namely h(T,
L)j and h(B, R)j. There is another tight absorbing set, namely the set of all pure strategy
combinations hT, Bj 3 hL, Rj, but it is not minimal and hence not persistent.
These solutions do not change if we add a weakly dominated strategy T 9 for player 1
to obtain the game in the middle. Although (T, L) is no longer a strict equilibrium, i.e., it
does not have a unique best reply, it is still a persistent equilibrium: As long as player 1
is almost certain that player 2 chooses L, he has no reason to switch to T 9. However, the
Nash equilibrium (T 9, L) is not even contained in any tight absorbing retract.
Finally, the unique persistent retract of the Matching-Pennies game on the right is the
whole strategy space DhT, Bj 3 DhL, Rj. Consequently the unique mixed strategy
equilibrium of this game is persistent.
4. Invariance
For the purposes of this paper we will call any map which assigns to each game G a
collection of subsets of D a solution concept. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) called aA
solution concept invariant if, roughly speaking, the addition or deletion of pure strategies
that are convex combinations of other pure strategies does not affect the solutions of a
game. To make this precise, we have to compare (solution) sets contained in strategy
spaces of different dimensions. The method suggested by Mertens (1987) uses reduction
maps to identify strategy profiles of the original game G and the game G 9, where
‘‘duplicate’’ strategies are deleted. This method can be formalized as follows.
Let G 5 kA, ul and G 9 5 kB, vl be two games. A map f 5 ( f ) from D to D isi i[N A Bpay
called a reduction map from G to G 9 (denoted by G fi G 9) if for every player i [ Nf
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1. f : D(A ) fi D(B ) is affine and ontoi i i
2. u 5 v + f.i i
The function v + f denotes the composition of v and f. The function f links strategyi i
profiles in the two games that are yielding each player the same payoff.
Definition. A solution concept s is weakly invariant if for any triplet (G, G 9, f ) with
pay
G fi G 9,f
s(G 9) 5 h f(S)u S [ s(G )j.
This property states that every image under f of a solution of the game G must be a
solution of the game G 9 and, conversely, that every solution of G 9 is the image under f
of a solution of G.
Definition. A solution concept s is called invariant if it is weakly invariant and,
moreover, for all T [ s(G 9),
21f (T ) 5 < hS [ s(G )u f(S) 5 T j.
This additional property states that every strategy profile of the game G whose image
under f is an element of a solution T of G 9 must be an element of a solution S of G
whose image under f equals T.
In the following example we will clarify these concepts using a number of pictures. In
the example payoff-equivalent strategies play an important role. We call two strategies xi
and y of player 1 payoff-equivalent if for all z [ D and all players j,i A
u ( z u x ) 5 u ( zuy ).j i j i
Note that in this situation no player cares whether player i plays x or y .i i
Example 2. In the picture below the triangle represents the strategy space of a game G.
In fact one can think of it as being the strategy space of a game in which player 1 has
three pure strategies while player 2 has only one pure strategy.
Now suppose that the topmost pure strategy is payoff-equivalent with the strategy at the
bottom connected to it by the dotted line. So, the game G can be thought of as being
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constructed from a ‘smaller’ game G 9 (in which player one has two pure strategies
which correspond with the two endpoints of the bottom line) by the addition of that
particular mixed strategy as a pure strategy. Then all strategies on the dotted line are
payoff-equivalent.
Moreover, every pair of strategies that are on a line parallel to this dotted line are also
payoff-equivalent. Thus, each strategy in the triangle is payoff-equivalent with (exactly)
one strategy on the bottom line. Consequently, we can identify each mixed strategy with
a unique mixed strategy in the smaller game. The mapping f that assigns to a mixed
strategy in the triangle the unique mixed strategy on the bottom line is (part of) a
reduction map.
In the next picture the fat line depicts a solution set S of G.
Now weak invariance roughly states that the collection f(S) of strategy profiles that
results from this identification must be a solution set of the smaller original game. (It
also states that for each solution set T of the smaller game we conversely have a solution
set S of the larger game such that f(S) 5 T.)
Invariance does do more than that though. Since in our example we have that the
topmost strategy is a copy of a strategy at the bottom we know that in particular the
strategies x and y indicated below are payoff-equivalent.
A first, naive, intuition of invariance now is the idea that the set S* in the second picture
below, obtained by the interchange of x and y (i.e. it is the union of the punctured fat
line and the single strategy y ), should also be a solution set. After all, from a purei
game-theoretic point of view, we can argue as follows. Given that we, players, consider
payoff-equivalent strategies as ‘identical’, and all of us do so, then it should not matter
whether x or y is played. So, if we think that S is a good solution, than we must consider
the set S* equally good.
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This requirement is very strong though, since it implies that at least some solution sets
are not closed as we can clearly see in the above figure. Even worse, there is no solution
we know of that satisfies this requirement.
There are several ways to get around this technical problem (there seems to be no
clear game theoretic argument against this stronger requirement). One of them is the
following.
Let S be a solution set of G. Further, let x be a strategy profile in S and let y be a
strategy profile that is payoff-equivalent with x (i.e., x is payoff-equivalent with y fori i
every i). Then there exists a solution set S* such that y is an element of S* and
moreover: a strategy profile z is payoff-equivalent to an element of S if and only if it is
payoff-equivalent to an element of S*. We express the latter condition by saying that S is
payoff-equivalent to S*.
In the above figure T does contain the strategy (profile) y. However, it does not satisfy
the additional condition, since it does not intersect as many equivalence classes as S
does. The set S* in the figure below does satisfy both conditions.
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Finally we remark that invariance is (if we disregard relabeling of pure strategies)
equivalent to weak invariance and the type of ‘‘shift’’ invariance mentioned above.
For a more detailed elaboration we refer to Mertens (1987) and Vermeulen and Jansen
(2000).
5. Invariance of solution concepts
The two invariance properties will now be checked for the solution concepts
introduced in the previous section. We will repeatedly use the following (straight-
forward) Lemma:
Lemma 1. If f is a reduction map from a game G to a game G 9, then y is a best reply to
x in the game G if and only if f( y) is a best reply to f(x) in the game G 9.
pay
Let (G, G 9, f ) be a triplet with G fi G 9. Let V 9 be a convex open neighborhood of af
product set R9 in the strategy space D of the game G 9 and let V be a convexA9
neighborhood of a product set R in the strategy space D of the game G such thatA
f(V ) 5V 9 and f(R) 5 R9.
Lemma 2. R absorbs V in the game G if and only if R9 absorbs V 9 in G 9. Consequently,
R is absorbing if and only if R9 is absorbing.
Proof. (a) Suppose that R9 absorbs V 9 in G 9. We will show that R absorbs V. To this end,
take a strategy profile x [V. Then obviously f(x) [V 9. So, since R9 absorbs V 9, there
exists a best reply y9 [ R9 to f(x). Furthermore, there exists a strategy profile y [ R with
f( y) 5 y9 since f(R) 5 R9. Then, by Lemma 1, y is a best reply to x.
(b) Conversely, suppose that R absorbs V in G. We will show that R9 absorbs V 9. To
this end, let x9 be a strategy profile in V 9. Then there exists a strategy profile x in V with
f(x) 5 x9, since f(V ) 5V 9. Furthermore, there exists a best reply y [ R to x, since R
absorbs V. Then f( y) [ R9 is a best reply to x9 by Lemma 1.
(c) To prove the second statement of the Lemma, suppose that R9 absorbs a convex
21
open neighborhood V 9 of itself. Let R be a product set with f(R) 5 R9. Then V[ f (V 9)
is a convex open neighborhood of R, since D is convex and f is affine and onto.A
Furthermore, f(V ) 5V 9. Hence, R absorbs V by (a). Conversely, suppose that the product
set R absorbs a convex open neighborhood V of itself. Then V 9[ f(V ) is a convex open
neighborhood of the product set R9 5 f(V ). Hence, R9 absorbs V 9 by (b). h
Proposition 3. Persistent sets and tight absorbing sets are invariant.
pay
Proof. (a) Let (G, G 9, f ) be a triplet with G fi G 9. Assume first that R is a tightf
absorbing or persistent set of the game G. Then the product set R9[ f(R) is absorbing by
Lemma 2. In order to show that R9 is also tight absorbing or persistent, suppose that
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S9 , R9 is a product set absorbing a convex neighborhood V 9 of R9. First note that
21 21S[ f (S9) > R is a product set since both f (S9) and R are product sets. Furthermore,
since S9 , R9 and R9 5 f(R), we obtain f(S) 5 S9. Therefore, by Lemma 2, S is a product
21
set absorbing the convex open neighborhood V[ f (V 9) of R. If R is a persistent set, it
cannot contain a proper product set absorbing V and hence S 5 R since S , R by
definition. If R is a tight absorbing set, we obtain S 5 R as well, since S absorbs any
sufficiently small neighborhood of R. We conclude in both cases that S9 5 f(S) 5 f(R) 5
R9. Hence, R9 is also either tight absorbing or persistent.
(b) Suppose now that R9 is a tight absorbing or persistent set of the game G 9. Fix
21
x [ f (R9) and define y [ f(x ) [ R9. Choose any product set R in D which contains0 0 0 A
x and for which f :R fi R9 is a bijection. By Lemma 2, R is an absorbing set of G. In0 uR
order to show that R is tight absorbing or persistent, let S , R absorb a convex
neighborhood of R. Then f(S) , R9 absorbs the open neighborhood f(V ) of R9 by Lemma
2. As in (a) we conclude f(S) 5 R9 since R9 is tight absorbing or persistent. Since S 7 R
and since f : R fi R9 is a bijection we conclude R 5 S. Therefore R is tight absorbing oruR
persistent. h
Mertens (1987) already noticed that persistent retracts and persistent equilibria are
weakly invariant.
Proposition 4. Tight absorbing retracts, persistent retracts and persistent equilibria are
weakly invariant.
Proof. Notice that Nash equilibria are invariant by Lemma 1. We will only give a proof
for tight absorbing retracts, since the proof for persistent retracts is completely
pay
analogous. Let (G, G 9, f ) be a triplet with G fi G 9.f
(a) Suppose that R is a persistent retract of G. Then ext(R) is a persistent set of G by
Proposition 1. So, by Proposition 3 we know that f(ext(R)) is a persistent set of G 9.
Hence,
f(R) 5 f(conv(ext(R))) 5 conv( f(ext(R)))
is a persistent retract of G 9 by Proposition 1.
(b) Suppose that R9 is a persistent retract of G 9. Then ext(R9) is a persistent set of G 9
with convex hull R9 by Proposition 1. So, there exists a persistent set S of G with
f(S) 5 ext(R9) by Proposition 3. Hence, conv(S) is a persistent retract of G by
Proposition 1, while f(conv(S)) 5 conv( f(S)) 5 conv(ext(R9)) 5 R9. h
The next example shows that persistent or tight absorbing retracts are not invariant.
Example 3. (Mertens, 1987) Persistent retracts and equilibria are not invariant. Consider
the games in the following figure:
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The first game G 9 is again Matching pennies, where the unique persistent (tight
9 9absorbing) retract of the first game is D(A ) 3 D(A ). In the second game G the mixed1 2
1 1
] ]strategy ( , ) of player 1 is duplicated. Let f 5 ( f , f ): D fi D be the affine map1 2 A A92 2
9where f equals the identity on D(A ) 5 D(A ) and where for (q , q , q ) [ D(A )2 2 2 1 2 3 1
1 1
] ]f (q , q , q )[(q 1 q , q 1 q ).1 1 2 3 1 3 2 32 2
pay(q denotes the probability for the added strategy.) We have G fi G 9. Propositions 1 and3 f
3 imply that hq [ D(A )uq 5 0j 3 D(A ) is the only persistent or tight absorbing retract1 3 2
1 1 1 1
] ] ] ]of the second game. (( , ), ( , )) is the only persistent equilibrium of the game G 9.2 2 2 2
1 1
] ]((0, 0, 1), ( , )) is a Nash equilibrium which is mapped by f onto the persistent2 2
equilibrium in G, although it does itself not belong to a persistent retract or even a tight
absorbing retract. Hence neither persistent or tight absorbing retracts nor persistent
equilibria are invariant. Although in this example the original persistent (tight absorbing)
retract remains persistent (or tight absorbing), we believe that the violation of invariance
1 1
] ]here is ‘severe’. Since (0, 0, 1) and ( , , 0) are payoff-equivalent strategies of player 1,2 2
1 1
] ]neither player cares whether (0, 0, 1) or ( , , 0) is played by 1 no matter what player 22 2
does. So, from a game-theoretical point of view, these strategies are indistinguishable.
1 1
] ]Hence, since ( , , 0) is part of a solution – a persistent retract /equilibrium in this case2 2
– one would want (0, 0, 1) also to be in a solution. This is not the case. The main reason
2
why persistent retracts lack invariance is the identification of mixed strategies with
1 1
] ]beliefs mentioned in Remark 1. In this case ( , , 0) is an element of the (unique)2 2
persistent retract because it reflects a belief over T and B. There are convincing
arguments why T and B should be in the solution (persistent set) of the game. Hence, the
1 1 1
] ] ]belief T 1 B is credible. However, the strategy B9, although payoff-equivalent to ( ,2 2 2
1
] , 0), is not a convex combination of likewise justified (pure) strategies. Therefore (0, 0,2
1) is not in the persistent set and hence persistent retracts lack invariance. See also the
discussion of Example 4. h
6. abr-Invariance
In order to define the third notion of invariance considered in this paper, we first
introduce an equivalence relation for games with the same strategy spaces. Two games
G 5 kA, ul and G * 5 kA, u*l are called admissible-best-reply-equivalent (abr-equivalent)
2Our main argument here is that we think this identification is not as inoccuous as is commonly assumed.
1 1
] ]Notice e.g. the two different interpretations of the equilibrium (( , 0, , 0), c) in Example 4.2 2
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if, for every completely mixed strategy profile x [ D , the set of best replies to x in theA
game G coincides with the set of best replies to x in the game G *.
Definition. A solution concept s is called abr-invariant if
s(G ) 5 s(G *)
for any pair of abr-equivalent games G and G *.
Remark 2. Abr-invariance requires first of all that a solution depends only on the
best-reply structure of a game and not on the actual utilities of the players. For instance,
the solution concept which assigns to a game the set of all Pareto-efficient Nash
equilibria is not abr-invariant.
Secondly, a solution may actually depend only on the admissible best reply
correspondence of a game. Hereby a strategy x is called an admissible best replyi
against a strategy combination y if there exist a sequence of strategy combinations
( y ) converging to y such that x is a best reply against each strategy combination ink k$1 i
the sequence. (Notice the similarity to the definition of a normal-form perfect
equilibrium in Selten, 1975.) Because a weakly dominated strategy is never a best reply
against a completely mixed strategy combination, abr-invariance implies that a solution
does not use weakly dominated pure strategies. (One could always decrease the payoffs
to such a strategy such that it becomes strictly dominated. The resulting game would be
abr-equivalent.) An abr-invariant solution concept may however contain weakly
dominated mixed strategies, as we will show in Example 4 below. Thus abr-invariance
differs slightly from the admissibility requirement discussed in Kohlberg and Mertens
(1986). See Mertens (1987) and Vermeulen and Jansen (1997) for further discussions
on the notion of abr-invariance.
Lemma 3. Suppose a product set P absorbs a non-empty open set V of strategy
combinations in a game G. Then P also absorbs V in any abr-equivalent game G *.
0 0Proof. Let V be the set of all completely mixed strategy combinations in V. Then V is
0
open and dense in V. Since P absorbs V in G and G * and since the best reply
correspondence is upper hemi-continuous, it follows that P absorbs V in G *. h
Using the lemma it follows straightforwardly from the definitions:
Proposition 5. Tight absorbing sets or retracts and persistent sets or retracts are
abr-invariant.
Proposition 6. Persistent equilibria are abr-invariant for two-player games.
Proof. Let x 5 (x , x ) be a persistent equilibrium of the game G. We have to show that x1 2
is also a persistent equilibrium of any abr-equivalent game G *. By Proposition 1 each
strategy x is in the convex hull of a set R , where R 3 R is a persistent set of G. Byi i 1 2
Proposition 5, R 3 R is also a persistent set in G *. Thus it remains to show that x is a1 2
124 D. Balkenborg et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 41 (2001) 111 –130
Nash equilibrium of G *. For this purpose we write each x as a convex combinationi
9o a (z ) ? z where R is a subset of R and each coefficient a (z ) is strictly positive.z [R i i i i i i i9i i
9The claim follows, if we can show that every z [ R is a best reply to x in G *.i i
9 9First note that each z [ R is a best reply to x in G. Moreover, every strategy z [ Ri i i i
is robust by Proposition 7 (in the appendix), i.e., it is a best reply against a non-empty
open subset of strategies in G. Then it must also be a best reply against some completely
mixed strategy combination y in G. So, since for a two-player game the function u ( y9uz )i i
is linear in y9, the strategy z must be a best reply in G against each of the completelyi
mixed strategy profiles y(l)[(1 2 l) ? x 1 l ? y with 0 , l # 1. Consequently, it is a
best reply against each y(l) (0 , l # 1) in the abr-equivalent game G *. By continuity, zi
is also a best reply against x 5 y(0), which concludes the proof. h
Example 4. Although persistent retracts and (for two-player games) persistent equilibria
are abr-invariant, they may use weakly dominated strategies: for the game
the unique persistent set is hA, B, C j 3 hcj and the unique persistent retract is the convex
1 1
] ]hull of this set. Thus the equilibrium (( , 0, , 0), c) is persistent, although it is not2 2 31 1
] ]perfect because the strategy ( , 0, , 0) is weakly dominated by B.2 2
1 1
] ]The fourth pure strategy D, payoff equivalent to ( , 0, , 0), is added to demonstrate2 2
to what extent persistent retracts may violate invariance. Note that the strategy D is not
1 1
] ]in the persistent retract. To understand why ( , 0, , 0) but not D can belong to a2 2
persistent retract it is useful to distinguish between beliefs over (possibly mixed)
4
strategies and the induced ‘‘expected’’ mixed strategy. Suppose player 2 is certain that
player 1 is choosing in the persistent set. However, he is uncertain about player 1’s
strategy choice and assigns equal probabilities to strategies A and C and zero probability
to strategy B. Then, although player 2 is certain that player 1 is not choosing a weakly
1 1
] ]dominated strategy, the ‘‘expected’’ mixed strategy ( , 0, , 0) induced by his belief is2 2
3Kalai and Samet (1984) showed in a three-person game that persistent equilibria do not have to be perfect.
They also showed that there is at least one perfect persistent equilibrium.
4 1 1
] ]In the interpretation indicated above, where the mixed strategy ( , 0, , 0) merely reflects the uncertainty of2 2
player 2, player 2’s belief is very ‘‘sound’’ and there is no obvious reason why the equilibrium should be
discarded. This interpretation of an equilibrium is in fact the one favoured by Aumann and Brandenburger
(1995) and it also underlies Harsanyi’s (1973) justification for equilibria in mixed strategies. The other
1 1
] ]interpretation is the one where player 1 actually chooses the weakly dominated strategy ( , 0, , 0) and player2 2
2 is certain that he does. For this interpretation the ‘‘trembling hand’’ argument underlying Selten’s (1975)
notion of perfection yields a compelling argument to discard the equilibrium.
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weakly dominated. In contrast, the only belief inducing the expected strategy D is the
belief that player 1 is choosing D with certainty, which is inconsistent with the
assumption that player 1 is not choosing a weakly dominated strategy. In general, a
weakly dominated strategy may belong to a persistent retract provided it represents a
belief which does not violate the assumption that players do not choose weakly
dominated strategies on purpose. Since only weakly dominated mixed strategies, but not
weakly dominated pure strategies, can satisfy this condition, the first may belong to a
persistent retract, but not the latter. Since one can always add a pure strategy to duplicate
any mixed one, invariance is necessarily violated.
In consequence, if one insists on the convexity requirement one can not avoid that the
solution may contain weakly dominated strategies and may violate invariance. On the
other hand, if one takes the view that persistent sets are the ‘‘proper’’ solution concept
and that persistent retracts merely describe the beliefs associated with these solutions,
invariance and very strong admissibility properties are naturally satisfied. h
Finally, the solution concept which assigns to every game the set of all persistent
equilibria is not abr-invariant for games with more than two players:
Counterexample. Consider the following three-person game G :
Player 1 picks the matrix, player 2 the row and player 3 the column. The second game
G * differs from G in the sense that player 1’s payoffs are slightly changed if he takes his
third strategy:
1 2 2Obviously, (e ,e ,e ) is a Nash equilibrium of the first, but not of the second game. We1 2 3
will show next that G and G * are abr-equivalent and then that the whole set of strategy
profiles is a persistent retract in both games. Hence, the above strategy profile is a
persistent equilibrium of G, but not of the abr-equivalent game G *.
G and G * are abr -equivalent: Since the payoffs for players 2 and 3 are not changed
in the two games it suffices to show that the set of pure best replies of player 1 against
any completely mixed strategy combination is the same in the two games. We can denote
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a strategy combination for the opponents by ( p, q) [ [0,1] , where p 5 prob(e ) and2
2q 5 prob(e ). The following Figure illustrates for both games how player 1’s payoff with3
l
one of his pure strategies e (l [ h1, 2, 3j) varies with the strategy combinations ( p, q) in1
2the unit square [0, 1] .
1The graphic on the left illustrates this for the game G. The payoff with e against ( p,1
2q) [ [0, 1] is calculated as 6pq 2 3p 2 3q 1 1. The graph of this function is the
2quadratic surface in the picture. With e player 1 obtains the constant payoff 0, which1
3yields the horizontal plane. With e he obtains p 1 q 2 1, which yields the non-1
1 2horizontal plane. When changing to G *, the payoffs for e and e are not altered, while1 1
3those for e are changed to 2( p 1 q 2 1). The corresponding plane is flipped upward in1
the graphic on the right and no longer intersects the quadratic surface above the point (1,
1).
3Since e yields strictly negative payoffs in the triangle h( p, q)u p 1 q , 1j and payoff1
0 along the diagonal h( p, q)u p 1 q 5 1j in both games, the best replies are the same in
the region h( p, q)u p 1 q # 1j. It therefore remains to study the best replies on the
3triangle h( p, q)u1 , p 1 qj. Here e yields strictly positive payoffs and is hence better1
2 1than e . To compare with the payoffs for e in G we calculate2 1
2 2 1
] ] ]6pq 2 3p 2 3q 1 1 , p 1 q 2 1 Û pq 2 p 2 q 1 , 03 3 3
2 2 4 1
] ] ] ]
Û pq 2 p 2 q 1 ,3 3 9 9
2 2 1
] ] ]
Û ( p 2 )(q 2 ) , .3 3 9
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2 2 2
] ] ]The inequality is satisfied if # p # 1, # q # 1 and ( p, q) ± (1,1). If p , , the first3 3 3
factor in the last inequality is negative and the second factor positive since q . 1 2 p.
32
]Similarly the inequality holds for q , . Thus e is the unique best reply on the region13 1h( p, q)u 1 , p 1 qj except for (1, 1), where e is also a best reply. When changing to G *1
3 3the payoffs for e are further increased on the region and e becomes the unique best1 1
reply even against (1,1).
In summary, the best replies on h( p, q)u 0 , p , 1j 3 h( p, q)u 0 , q , 1j are the same
in both games, i.e., the two games are abr-equivalent.
Determination of the persistent retract: It remains to be shown that the whole
strategy space is a persistent retract in G and G *. Since both games are abr-equivalent, it
suffices to show that any persistent set of G * must contain all pure strategy combina-
tions. Since the games have no player-equivalent strategies, a persistent set can only
contain pure strategy combinations.
Let R 5 R 3 R 3 R be a persistent set of G *. Let V5V 3V 3V be a convex open1 2 3 1 2 3
neighborhood of R which is absorbed by R.
1 1(i) Suppose R contains e . Consider a strategy profile (e , x ) [ R 3V with x1 1 1 3 1 3 3
2
completely mixed. The unique best reply of player 2 against such a profile is e . Hence2
2 2 3 2
e [ R . Similarly, e [ R . Furthermore, e is the unique best reply of player 1 to (e ,2 2 3 3 1 2
2 3 1 1
e ). Hence, e [ R . But then it follows as before that e [ R and e [ R . Therefore3 1 1 2 2 3 3
2R 5 A and R 5 A . One calculates that e is the unique best reply against the strategy2 2 3 3 1
3 2 3 2
] ] ] ]pair (( , ), ( , )) [V 3V . It is therefore contained in R . Thus R 5 A 3 A 3 A .2 3 1 1 2 35 5 5 5
2 3 1 1(ii) Suppose now that e [ R or that e [ R . Then (e , e ) [ R 3 R and therefore1 1 1 1 2 3 2 3
1
e [ R . Step (i) implies R 5 A 3 A 3 A , which concludes the discussion of the1 1 1 2 3
example. h
7. Conclusions
We have argued that persistent sets (or tight absorbing sets) can be viewed as strongly
self-enforcing sets of rules. We have seen that these solution concepts satisfy all the
invariance properties discussed here.
Mertens (1987) has noted that persistent retracts do not satisfy the invariance
requirement related to the addition of a payoff-equivalent strategy. However, we have
shown that persistent retracts correspond to the sets of beliefs associated with a
persistent set. We therefore think that the lack of invariance of persistent retracts is
caused by the identification of beliefs and mixed strategies.
The lack of invariance properties of persistent equilibria is more severe. It occurs
because the concept does not refine among the equilibria within a persistent retract,
although it restricts the set of equilibria to be considered. To satisfy all invariance
properties it is hence necessary to amend further refinement requirements to the concept.
For instance, Mertens (1992) has shown that every persistent retract contains a
strategically stable set as reformulated in Mertens (1989). Such ‘‘persistent stable sets’’
satisfy all the invariance properties.
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Appendix A
In the following we fix an arbitrary game G. We need some additional terminology
before stating our first Lemma. A strategy x [ D(A ) is called a robust best reply ofi i
player i against the strategy combination y [ D , if x is a best reply against all strategyA i
combinations in a neighborhood of x in D . Any strategy which is a robust best replyA
against some strategy combination is called robust. We call x a semi-robust best replyi
against y, if there exists a sequence ( y ) converging to y such that x is a robust bestk k$0 i
reply against each y . Finally, a face of the strategy simplex D(A ) is the convex hull ofk i
a non-empty subset of pure strategies.
Lemma 4. (i) The sets of robust best replies against a strategy combination y [ D isA
either empty or a full player-equivalence class that forms a face of the strategy simplex
D(A ).i
(ii) There exists a semi-robust best reply against every strategy combination y [ D .A
(iii) If x is a semi-robust best reply against y then there is a strategy combination zi
arbitrarily close to y such that all best replies against z are player-equivalent to x .i
9Proof. (i) Suppose x is a robust best reply against y. If x is player-equivalent to x , theni i i
9 9 9x is a best reply whenever x is and therefore x is a robust best reply against y. If x isi i i i
9a robust best reply against y then x is player-equivalent to x by Lemma 4 in Kalai andi i
Samet (1984). Hence the set of all robust best replies against y is a player-equivalence
9class. Moreover, if x is a robust best reply against y and a a pure strategy in thei i
9 9support of x , then a is a best reply against a strategy-combination whenever x is.i i i
9Consequently a is also a robust best reply against y and therefore player-equivalent to xi i
and hence to x . It follows that the player equivalence class of x is a face of D(A ).i i i
(ii) Consider any open neighborhood of y. By Lemma 5 in Kalai and Samet (1984)
there exists a strategy combination y9 in this neighborhood such that all best replies
against y9 are player-equivalent. Their proof reveals moreover that all best replies
k
against y9 are robust best replies against y9. We can consequently find a sequence ( y )k$1
k
converging to y such that the set of best replies against each y is equal to the set of
k k
robust best replies against y . Since the set of best replies against y is a face of the
strategy simplex and since D(A ) has only finitely many faces, we can choose thei
k k
sequence ( y ) such that the set of (robust) best replies against y consists of the samek$1
face F of strategies for all k $ 1. Therefore each x [ F is a semi-robust best replyi
against y.
(iii) Let x be a semi-robust best reply against y and choose an open neighborhood Ui
of y. By definition, there exists z [ U such that x is a robust best reply against z andi
therefore an open neighborhood V7 U of z such that x is a best reply against eachi
z9 [V. By Lemma 5 in Kalai and Samet (1984) we can choose z9 [V such that all best
replies against z9 are player-equivalent to x . hi
By the previous lemma, the set of robust strategies of a player is a non-empty disjoint
union of faces of his strategy simplex. Each such face is a player-equivalence class. We
denote the collection of these faces by ^ . Notice that each F [ ^ will consist of ai i
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single pure strategy, if the player has no pure player-equivalent strategies. We call a
non-empty subset of strategies of a player sparse, if it contains at most one strategy from
each of these faces. This is equivalent to: The non-empty set consists of robust strategies
that are not player-equivalent. Since the strategy simplex has only finitely many faces, a
sparse set of strategies is finite. Since these faces are all disjoint, no strategy in a sparse
set can be a convex combination of other strategies in the set.
Let U be a non-empty open subset of D . We say that a subset of strategies for aA
player tightly absorbs U if it absorbs U while no proper subset absorbs U. A product set
tightly absorbs U, if each of its components does.
Lemma 5. Let U be a non-empty open subset of D . Then:A
(a) Every strategy set of a player that absorbs U contains a subset that tightly absorbs
U.
(b) A strategy set that tightly absorbs U is sparse.
9Proof. Suppose R absorbs U. Let R denote the set of strategies in R that arei i i
semi-robust best replies against some strategy combination in U. Lemma 4 (ii) and (iii)
9 99implies that R absorbs U. Let R be a set obtained by selecting for each face F [ ^ ai i i
9 99single strategy in F > R , if this intersection is not empty. Then R is sparse andi i
absorbs U by construction. Moreover, the following argument shows that it tightly
99absorbs U : Let x [ R . Then x is a semi-robust best reply against some y [ U. Byi i i
Lemma 4 (iii) we can find y9 [ U such that all best replies against U are player-
99equivalent. Therefore x is the only best reply against y9 contained in R .i i
9Suppose that moreover R tightly absorbs U. Then it follows R 5 R 9. Hence R isi i i i
sparse. h
The definitions imply:
n
Proposition 7. A non-empty product set R 5P R in D is a tight absorbing set if andi A
i51
only if R tightly absorbs each sufficiently small convex open neighborhood of itself. In
particular, each component R is sparse.i
Proposition 8. Every absorbing set contains a persistent set.
Proof. Let R be an absorbing set. Using Lemma 5 (a) we can find a product set R9 7 R
that tightly absorbs some convex open neighborhood U of R. R9 is finite since each of its
components is sparse. If R9 is not an absorbing set, then it will properly contain another
absorbing set. If the latter is not absorbing, it will again properly contain some absorbing
set etc. Since R9 is finite, we will find after finitely many steps an absorbing set that does
not properly contain an absorbing set, i.e., a persistent set. h
We have now all the tools to give the Proof of Proposition 1. We only give the proof
for persistency. The proof for tight absorbing sets / retracts is similar.
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(i) implies (ii): Let R be a persistent retract. By Proposition 8, R contains a persistent
set R9 7 R. Then conv(R9) 7 R is an absorbing retract and therefore R 5 conv(R9).
9(ii) implies (iii): Let R 5 conv(R9), where R9 is a persistent set. Since each R is ai
sparse, it consists of finitely many strategies lying on disjoint faces of D(A ). We obtaini
9 9ext(R ) 5 ext(conv(R )) 5 R for each player i and hence ext(R) 5 R9. Moreover, R isi i i
closed and convex.
(iii) implies (i): Since R is convex, ext(R) 5 R9 and R9 is finite, we obtain R 5
conv(R9). An absorbing retract R0 contained in R must contain a persistent set by
Proposition 7 But this persistent set must be R9. Hence conv(R9) , R99 , R 5 conv(R9)
since conv(R9) and R are closed. Therefore R is a persistent retract. h
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